Ramón Aguilar is a lawyer who graduated from the Central University of Venezuela (UCV), specializing in procedural law and labor law, with more than 30 years of experience in litigation, negotiation, and arbitration in the fields of civil, commercial, labor, and administrative law.
He currently serves as an arbitrator and mediator at the Business Center for Conciliation and Arbitration in Caracas, Venezuela, and is an international partner at the Madrid-based law firm AMS Abogados.
He has been a professor at Universidad Central de Venezuela, teaching Civil Law I and Civil Procedural Law I at the undergraduate level, and General Theory of Procedure in the Procedural Law Specialization at the graduate level.
1. You say that Venezuela has entered a phase of “remote control” in which the U.S. government exercises de facto constituent power. How can this tutelage be prevented from nullifying national sovereignty, so that it serves exclusively as a legitimate bridge toward the restoration of the 1999 Constitution, freedoms, institutions, and progress?
Venezuelan sovereignty has been violated for a long time, especially that which resides in the citizen’s vote. At this moment, the attempt is to rebuild constitutional order.
The Trump administration has identified stabilization, recovery, and transition as objectives; reconciliation has subsequently been added. We believe that these objectives clearly point toward the restoration of constitutional order and sovereignty. However, we disagree with the order or priorities being assigned to them. We believe that the transition to democracy should be a priority or, at the very least, proceed at the same pace as stabilization and economic recovery.
2. In your analysis, you propose a coalition government to reorganize entities such as the Supreme Court, the National Electoral Council, and PDVSA. Beyond the force of facts, what legal mechanism would give legitimacy to these temporary appointments so that their decisions are not overturned in the future by international courts or new governments, thereby enabling democratic change in the country?
The 1999 Constitution mandates its defense and restoration in the event of violations, such as those we are currently experiencing. However, it does not provide rules or mechanisms for doing so. In this regard, a process must be established that complies with the principles set forth in the Constitution itself, primarily democratic principles, that is, citizen participation and democratic factors in general.
This authority is temporary and must then be reviewed and, if appropriate, legitimized once a new National Assembly is appointed. At this point, it may be appointed by some form of co-government, a joint assembly, or any mechanism that involves the predominant and active participation of democratic forces. It is unlikely to be in the proportion of 70/30, as the last elections showed; however, at the very least, for this idea of national reconciliation and transition, the Supreme Court justices, judges, CNE rectors, the attorney general, and all those constitutional bodies that have been suppressed, captured, or manipulated by the Chavista regime must undoubtedly be replaced.
3. You warn that injecting capital without dismantling the repressive apparatus (DGCIM, SEBIN, and colectivos) is “turning the wheel of corruption.” Do you believe that the Donald Trump administration is willing to prioritize institutional reform over the urgent need to stabilize the energy market and the economy and offer possibilities for the return of the Venezuelan diaspora?
That is a false dilemma: the transition must be, and is, toward democracy. The economy is something that is present and must be addressed, but we cannot wait to rebuild the economy, because that rebuilding also depends on the legitimacy of the government and institutions, on the political and social guarantees given to those investments. We hope that the Trump administration will soon realize this necessary symbiosis and change its order of priorities.
4. You mention that it is imperative to expel advisors from Cuba, Russia, Iran, and China. From your legal and political perspective, what should be the status of the international agreements and treaties signed by the previous administration with these countries? Should they be denounced or simply ignored?
All agreements with other countries must be reviewed. Legitimate debts must be restructured within the general process developed for that purpose. But agreements that involve foreign factors continuing to manage Venezuelan institutions, such as SAIME, security systems, the health system, or sports, must be banned. We cannot accept officials, spies, facilitators, or people who come to control institutions in Venezuela.
5. You invoke the extension of the Executive Order of January 9, 2026, to protect CITGO and manage the debt. Is the US legal framework sufficient to shield Venezuelan assets from aggressive creditors, or is a binding resolution by the new democratic transitional government essential to seek mechanisms and agreements that allow for concerted solutions?
Venezuela’s first and foremost trading partner should be the United States. That country holds Venezuela’s main foreign assets, including the accounts of PDVSA and the Republic. It is essential that the United States maintain the protection or blockade of these assets and accounts until the orderly process of restructuring Venezuela’s external public debt has been verified. As long as this protection exists, assets such as CITGO cannot be seized or foreclosed upon, which will allow for an orderly negotiation process with all creditors.
6. You state that the release of political prisoners is not a humanitarian gesture, but rather a “condition of viability.” How do you propose to handle the tensions of transitional justice? Is it possible to enact an amnesty law that satisfies democratic forces without creating a perception of impunity for crimes against humanity committed by the current regime that has been in power for decades?
We return to the issue of legitimacy and democratization. The amnesty law, or any other transitional law, cannot be enacted by a spurious National Assembly without democratic legitimacy. Torturers and persecutors cannot enact laws for transition and reconciliation. These laws must be enacted by a consensus-based body, with the predominant participation of democratic forces.
Therefore, the Trump administration must seek guarantees for the release of all political prisoners and the return of exiles. It is important to note that an amnesty law is not required for the release of political prisoners. An amnesty law is required for reconciliation, to establish mechanisms for the definitive closure of proceedings, to end persecution, to notify Interpol authorities and international organizations, and to enable exiles and those who have been persecuted to recover their property and freedoms in Venezuela, in addition to receiving the corresponding compensation.
The amnesty law does not grant pardon for crimes against humanity or human rights violations.
7. Your report calls for prioritizing the popular sovereignty expressed in July 2024. What specific institutional role should the 8.7 million Venezuelans who emigrated abroad play in this new transitional architecture, beyond sending remittances or physically returning?
The immediate return of exiles who wish to return and resume their daily lives and participate in the democratic and economic reconstruction of the country must be guaranteed. Furthermore, this implies that those exiles who do not wish to return to Venezuela should be able to participate in the elections that will surely be held to legitimize the authorities in Venezuela, beginning with the National Assembly.
8. How do you envision the recovery and development of the hydrocarbon and mining industries and other sectors that enable economic growth, the creation of formal jobs, and the establishment of a welfare society?
Venezuela is a land of grace. With proper management and guarantees, reconstruction is entirely feasible and possible. Of course, it is necessary to rebuild the institutions and regulations already provided for in the Constitution and in the laws to send workers to the oil industry and any other industry. We must talk about wage increases, the reconstruction of the social security system, and freedom of association. Again, it is a matter of complying with the law.
9. The oil industry will be key to any recovery process. How can a robust and competitive oil industry be reactivated without repeating the mistakes of the past, while ensuring fair, legal, and merit-based labor standards?
The problem with Venezuela’s oil industry and other key industries has never been, nor was it ever, a matter of labor rights. These sectors had the best collective bargaining agreements in Venezuela; it was a privilege to work for PDVSA or in the hydrocarbon industry in general. The problem was corruption, lack of maintenance, and ignorance that replaced the merit system after Chávez fired 23,000 workers between 2002 and 2003. The law must be obeyed. That’s all.
10. In communities where oil activity takes place, what role do labor rights and the professionalization of work play in ensuring that the sector’s recovery generates real well-being, local economic growth, and sustainable opportunities, rather than just concentrated income?
We return to the topic of the symbiosis between economics and democracy. If wells are reactivated or new ones are drilled, if refineries and all the machinery that this entails are reactivated, public and private companies can and must pay the corresponding labor rights. Furthermore, the interior of the country, where production and refining take place, can cease to be a desert of poverty and abandonment produced by Chavismo, giving way to the production or reconstitution of industrial cities, commercial cities, and productive cities.
11. In a scenario of transition to democracy, what would you say are the first labor rights that must be restored in order to begin rebuilding trust between workers and the Venezuelan state?
The first thing is to increase wages and eliminate the perverse bonus system; abolish general tenure, which is a cancer; and, of course, revive freedom of association. Restoring wages is absolutely necessary. Not only is it a constitutional mandate, but it is also part of our culture and an unavoidable social debt. Salaries must be what the Constitution establishes: decent, and also the basis for calculating many other benefits. Rebuilding the structure and concept of salaries is fundamental.
Another major challenge is to rebuild social security, healthcare in hospitals and health centers, and benefits, with an increase and guarantee of old-age and disability pensions.
12. How can a democratic transition translate into stronger labor institutions, where freedom of association, meritocracy, and clear rules for both workers and employers are respected?
As is clear, the “business state” must be eliminated or minimized, and private companies must be given space and room within it. Of course, labor laws must be respected, and for this to happen, fundamental institutions such as the Supreme Court of Justice and labor judges must be restructured, modified, and changed, the Ministry of Labor must intervene, and, possibly by decree, tripartite commissions must be reinstated at both the national and regional levels so that workers and employers can participate in the new social agreements that will bring about and sustain economic recovery.
The views expressed by Ramón Aguilar are of his personal ownership and responsibility, and do not necessarily reflect the position of PDVSA Ad Hoc.
If you want to learn more about this topic, we invite you to read this week’s article: “Venezuela and the new oil opening: the expected impact on communities,” which explores the potential impact of the reactivation of the oil industry on the local and national economy.
You can read the article here.
