Tomás Páez is a sociologist who graduated from the Central University of Venezuela and obtained his Ph.D. and M.Phil. from University College London. He is a founding member of the Global Network of the Venezuelan Diaspora, as well as CEDES (Center for the Development of Citizenship and Democracy) and the Center for the Study of Migration and Diasporas (2022).
Since 2013, he has been the coordinator of the Venezuelan Diaspora Observatory (ODV) Project and the First Global Study of the Venezuelan Diaspora. He is the coordinator of the SME and Entrepreneurship Observatory, a founding member of the International Institute for Entrepreneurial Training (INFOEM) at the Metropolitan University, and a member of the team responsible for the project “Entrepreneurship and Integration of the Venezuelan Diaspora” in Bogotá, Colombia.
He is the author and co-author of more than 20 books and dozens of articles on the topics of strategy, quality and productivity, diaspora, and migration. He has also served as an international lecturer in the United States, Spain, France, Germany, Colombia, Italy, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Portugal, and Argentina.
1. You have mentioned that the Venezuelan diaspora is spread across more than 90 countries, which you have called a “new transnational geography” that has the potential to contribute value to the reconstruction of Venezuela. How could the Venezuelan diaspora play a role in Venezuela’s economic, social, and knowledge renaissance?
I believe it is important to contextualize the Venezuelan migration phenomenon. An unprecedented exodus of more than 9 million citizens, 30% of its population, which the Venezuelan regime ignores, hides, and is capable of denying its existence. In fact, there are no official data on the diaspora, as the agency responsible for statistics does not produce information related to migration. Information is a public good in a democracy, and its absence harms businesses and institutions. This inexplicable void has been filled by the Venezuelan Diaspora Observatory (ODV), which has been investigating institutions in host countries since 2014, when we conducted the first global study of the Venezuelan exodus in 90 countries around the world. Later, in 2018, the United Nations established the Venezuelan Refugees (R4V) program, which delves deeper into the analysis of data in 23 countries that host migrants from Venezuela.
The lack of information highlights the Venezuelan government’s disregard for its citizens and manifests itself in the institutional vacuum that impacts the actions of Venezuelan migrants. I would suggest changing the tense of your question and, instead of placing it in the future, “how could” I would phrase it in the present tense and in the gerund, what is it doing and what role is the diaspora playing in the rebirth of Venezuela. The diaspora is not waiting for something to happen, it is carving out that future. It is doing so in various ways: documenting, denouncing, and disseminating information about the situation in Venezuela in all areas: the environment, politics, pensions and retirement, human rights and political rights, etc. It is also developing projects and initiatives in different areas, creating companies, establishing business and institutional alliances, and providing social and economic remittances.
The diaspora and its organizations have had to face and make room for themselves between two extremes. On the one hand, there is a lack of understanding of the profound changes taking place in the fabric of Venezuelan society and, on the other, there is the apathy and institutional vacuum created by the Venezuelan regime, the “Absent State.” Diaspora organizations have filled this space by engaging in “public diplomacy” as an alternative to “official diplomacy” and developing a geopolitical strategy that is opposed to that of the regime. This public diplomacy is not only denunciation, it is also the construction of networks and alliances. In fact, Tomás Páez emphasizes that since 2017, the main events of the diaspora have been dedicated to the role it will play in the reconstruction of Venezuela. In other words, the lines of action, the main areas of work, the networks, and the projects in fields such as entrepreneurship, communication, mental health, health, the environment, science, and initiatives in the fields of culture, music, etc. have already been identified.
The millions of Venezuelans who are building the “New Geography”—social, economic, and institutional—are expanding conventional borders and creating a new reality. The number of ambassadors, commercial, technological, cultural, and scientific attachés around the world is multiplying, and with them, opportunities. This is happening despite the vacuum, absence, and obstacles imposed by the Venezuelan regime.
2. Considering the geographical dispersion and diversity of Venezuelans around the world, what are the biggest challenges to achieving effective and unified “diaspora governance”?
In my response, I would emphasize the answer to the following question: What are the benefits of having a diaspora? This has been caused by the devastation of the country, which has experienced a very deep crisis, with few or no precedents in history. The economic contraction of 80% of GDP, a level not reached by any country during World War II, shortages, wages and pensions below the extreme poverty threshold established by multilateral organizations. Migration has created a new reality that makes it impossible to understand Venezuela without taking this unique fact into account.
The starting point lies in understanding that we are facing a new reality, a social and economic mutation: there are few families without relatives (children, grandchildren, uncles, grandparents, parents) living across borders. The segment of the population of productive and reproductive age has migrated, and their descendants are growing up in the “New Geography.” The new map includes and expands the one we all know. That third of the population that has moved further away continues to grow in the more than 500 cities and 90 countries where they now reside, including Greenland.
This profound transformation involves changes in family structure, population structure and pyramid, and the criteria and methodologies used to make population projections. It is not possible to exclude the descendants of the diaspora from these projections. The Venezuelan population is growing significantly in other countries because the diaspora is mainly made up of young people, with an average age of 36-37, i.e., they are of productive and reproductive age, and the population is growing in other countries. The new reality challenges notions of “territory” and even the notion of the “nation-state.” I think of the Italian exodus, a country with 80 million citizens and more than 200 million “Italians,” and the words of that country’s president, Sergio Mattarella, who affirms that Italy cannot be understood apart from its migrants.
The diaspora is made up of people, of immense human capital, an asset that the country has, an enormous “international reserve” committed to Venezuela and its development, who work daily and collaborate in the process of restoring democracy and rebuilding the country. They are part of that process from today onwards; physical return is not essential because, in reality, they have never been absent.
Those who see physical return as a condition for being part of the recovery process or as the end of the migration cycle are mistaken. Human capital, like knowledge, skills, and competencies, circulates, especially at a time when communication offers multiple facilities and possibilities. Many arrived alone, others in newly formed couples, and today they are parents or grandparents, with stable jobs and businesses after having held various positions. Twenty-seven years have passed. Venezuela is the best mirror and example in which to analyze issues related to the “circulation” and return of human capital. At this time of deep crisis, the migrants that the country received from different origins (Italy, the Basque Country, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Peru, etc.) contributed to the reconstruction of their countries of origin and host countries while living in Venezuela. Many remain in the country despite the adverse circumstances, while others have decided to return, confirming once again the results of various studies on the subject.
How has the diaspora opened up spaces in the face of the walls of state absence and the misunderstanding and simplification of others? The answer has been the creation of more than a thousand organizations whose efforts, narratives, and services have allowed them to gain the TRUST of their compatriots and the institutions of communities and institutions in the countries that offer their HOSPITALITY to Venezuelan migrants.
Venezuelans’ distrust of the Venezuelan regime is absolute, as demonstrated by the results of the 2015 parliamentary elections and the July 28, 2024 presidential elections: all citizens detest the government. Those who make up the diaspora express the same absolute distrust of the government, although to a lesser extent, they also express distrust of political parties, while declaring great confidence in civil society organizations.
These organizations have also created networks and established local and transnational alliances, i.e., collaboration agreements with cross-border associations and institutions, including those operating within the “conventional map” we all know. For example, in the area of entrepreneurship, there are transnational agreements and lines of work that include organizations that promote entrepreneurship within the known map of “Venezuela.” The same is true of the organizational networks created in the fields of communication, human rights, higher education, mental health, among others. The strength and robustness of the agreements and alliances is conditioned by the clarity of the project and the level of support it manages to achieve, but there is no doubt that a complex web has been woven, a strong social fabric that will be key in the process of recovery and reconstruction of the country.
The starting point is: how to take advantage of the benefits of having a diaspora. We have noted the benefits of the New Geography (expanded gastronomy, extended culture, innovative relational capital, new skills and competencies, among many others), immense human capital committed to the country’s development, and a strategy forged by thousands of organizations. In order to further this effort, we need better quality and more accurate information on the human and relational capital of the diaspora.
The diaspora is more than just numbers, which is why it is not enough to know how many there are; it is important to know where they are, what they do, in which sectors they work, where and what our engineers, lawyers, administrators, and doctors do around the world: What do they do? Do they own companies? Do they run colleges, universities, or research centers? Do they work in platforms, media, or publishing houses? This information is relevant for establishing the most suitable form of participation in the country’s reconstruction process, because that process will need the enormous potential that the diaspora holds.
In addition, they act as ambassadors, cultural, commercial, and technological attachés, etc. Their work is carried out through organizations and associations, which must be strengthened. It is difficult to reach more than 9 million Venezuelans in isolation, hence the importance of associations, whose participation makes it possible to multiply the reach of any policy or initiative. Citizens connect through organizations that they have created and in which they trust. Therefore, contributing to the strengthening of these organizations and transnational organizational networks, working alongside them, listening to them, and supporting them is an important condition for facing the challenges ahead.
It is necessary to avoid the temptation to colonize them, as has happened in the recent past. It is not easy to avoid incitement, but the democratic model has an obligation to respect plurality and recognize the existence of a dynamic civil society that exercises public diplomacy in areas such as culture, music, gastronomy, and education, that engages in politics, and that will sometimes disagree with and distance itself from official diplomacy. This is a challenge for the new official diplomacy, which will need to adapt to this unique reality, in which respect and the ability to listen on the part of state institutions must be the norm and core criterion of the Diaspora Governance Strategy.
The implementation of the strategy and the policies derived from it require a new institutional framework. This framework is inspired by the strategy implemented by the Venezuelan government in 1936 when it enacted the immigration law and created the institutional framework with the aim of attracting migrants, preferably Europeans. The strategy was led by the state. Today, almost 90 years later, a new strategy is essential in order to take advantage of the human capital of the diaspora and an innovative institutional framework in which civil society organizations, business and professional associations, and local governments play an essential role. It is a matter of recognizing and building on the work of those responsible for forging the strategy. The new institutional framework includes the central public sector, which is responsible for formulating policies and regulations. The fact that migration occurs in communities, cities, and localities gives local governments a unique importance in the design and implementation of the strategy in establishing partnerships with local institutions in those regions and cities with the largest number of Venezuelan migrants.
3. How does diaspora activism translate into a tangible impact on the decisions of governments and international institutions, beyond raising awareness, with a view to a possible change in Venezuela’s political leadership model?
The impacts of activism are very difficult to enumerate due to their quantity, diversity, and quality. They occur in two directions. On the one hand, the diaspora and its associations acquire new skills, knowledge, business and institutional contacts, and competencies that are extremely useful in view of a change in the political model in Venezuela. It is an active part of initiatives and projects that embody everything that the diaspora values: democracy, respect for plurality, social security, the exercise of citizenship, etc.
On the other hand, its impacts on the host society, among citizens, and in the country of origin are very difficult to enumerate due to their quantity, diversity, and quality. Its impacts are reported in the economic, social, cultural, political, and other spheres. In the latter sphere, the actions of the diaspora have made possible statements by local, national, and supranational parliaments, civil society organizations and institutions, universities, and international networks. In areas such as the environment, human rights, and political persecution, organizations document, denounce, and publicize the serious situation in the country.
The field of communication has been addressed in a particular way in order to combat prejudice and stigmatization that negatively affect the Venezuelan community. It provides information to the media and platforms, including those that for a long time remained neutral or simply took a backseat to what was happening in Venezuela, denounces violations of freedom of expression, and constructs narratives with real grounds to confront the xenophobic positions of some leaders, governments, and political parties.
In this and other areas of human endeavor, the diaspora has formed associations and platforms. These include associations of Venezuelan journalists, a network of human rights organizations, associations of engineers and architects, health and mental health associations, cultural associations, a network for entrepreneurship, innovation, and business creation, associations of scientists and universities, and, in each area, alliances and agreements for collaboration and cooperation with counterpart institutions and organizations in the host communities and communities of origin. Their actions refute some of the terrible stories we have heard from certain political party candidates or representatives who have spoken out against Venezuelan migration in a shocking manner.
In cultural and economic terms, its effects are only just beginning to be assessed and quantified. In economic terms, for example, its positive effects are felt equally in host countries and countries of origin. Some countries and regions receiving the diaspora have measured the impact on consumption, aggregate demand, and tax revenue. With regard to the country of origin, efforts have been made to quantify the remittances that the diaspora sends to their families. Some sources estimate this figure to be between US$4 billion and US$6 billion.
Beyond the numbers, the impact is very significant. Many families in Venezuela are able to make ends meet thanks to remittances. The small investments made by the diaspora in regions and communities in Venezuela have not yet been quantified. In our radio and television program (La Voz de la Diáspora), which we have been broadcasting weekly since 2017, first on Thays Peñalver’s program on Radio Caracas Radio (RCR750) and now on the Observatory’s YouTube channel (ODVdiaspora.org), more than 600 diaspora organizations have been able to share the tangible impacts of their work.
4. In a potential scenario of political change, the conversation about the return of part of the diaspora begins. What structural conditions (beyond legal and political security) do you consider essential for the return of human capital, knowledge, and financial resources from the diaspora to be not only desirable but also sustainable in the long term for Venezuela’s economic and social recovery?
The decision to migrate or return is an individual and family matter and is conditioned by the context and the assessment of that context by the person making the decision. In this area, “single-cause” explanations are excluded. There are many variables and considerations involved: economic, cultural, emotional, social, etc.
The decision to participate in Venezuela’s economic and social recovery has little or nothing to do with returning. The one does NOT depend on the other. It is possible to participate, to be an active part in the country’s recovery process without this implying the physical presence of the person in the “old map.” As we have pointed out, we are in the presence of a New Geography, and diaspora organizations are working on the economic and social reactivation of Venezuela, despite the obstacles imposed by the regime to prevent it.
Participation and better use do not depend on returns, but rather on public policies aimed at facilitating integration and thus benefiting from the existence of a huge diaspora. These policies are part of a strategy aimed at using human capital, regardless of where they currently reside, in the reconstruction of the country. The current vacuum created by a regime that ignores its diaspora despite all its contortions to turn the deportation of Venezuelans into a program of return to the homeland must be remedied with a battery of policy instruments, some of which have been outlined by diaspora organizations and collected in our book, What do we do with the diaspora?: governance strategy in a global country.
The diaspora and its organizations are not waiting for change; they are actively participating in the transformation. It is not about the future; it is about building the present and envisioning the future. It has been doing so since day one: learning, acquiring skills and competencies, building networks, exchanging ideas and knowledge, documenting and reporting, sending medicine and food, particularly at critical times when there was a marked shortage of these items in the country, and sending remittances and investing.
The diaspora participates and can continue to do so from wherever they currently reside. This is a starting point that is at odds with those who see return as the only possibility for participation. Understanding that human capital will not necessarily return to the country but that it is willing, interested, and committed to rebuilding the country is essential in designing the governance strategy. The results of the first global study and the findings of subsequent investigations corroborate the commitment of migrants to Venezuela, which is what makes this migration a diaspora. Their commitment has been demonstrated through actions and deeds, and as the saying goes, these are acts of love and not good reasons.
Analyses and studies conducted on the subject of return suggest that the average return rate is around 30%, and in some cases the percentage may be higher. We do not know what will happen in the case of the Venezuelan exodus; here, any speculation in one direction or another is equally valid and remains conjecture. In any case, I believe that this is not the central issue. The question I consider most appropriate is how to best take advantage of the immense human and relational capital of the diaspora, which is now facilitated by the presence of communication and information technologies and programs. Today, it is possible to perform surgical procedures via the internet in remote parts of the country, train human capital, invest, provide advisory and technical assistance services, and much more. The diaspora also facilitates the internationalization of companies and institutions and the establishment of strategic commercial, technological, and financial alliances at both ends, i.e., in both the country of origin and the host country. To make this sustainable in the long term, a governance strategy is necessary.
5. What would it take to attract the diaspora back to the country?
What would it take to attract them? In order to take advantage of the diaspora, it is necessary to assess its importance, to understand that this human capital is an asset, an international reserve that participates and wishes to continue doing so for the benefit of the country. In addition, it is necessary to seek more and better information about where they are, what they do, how organizations interact with their communities, and improve our ability to listen in order to understand their expectations and realities. We must deepen our knowledge of their networks, projects, initiatives, agreements, and transnational alliances in order to strengthen the quality of the strategy.
We addressed this issue in a previous response. From our perspective, participation has nothing to do with return. Some studies evaluating policies designed to promote return have found that return is independent of the regulatory framework created for that purpose. Both the decision to migrate and the decision to return are individual in nature and are influenced by contextual factors. Certainly, return could be facilitated if the country guarantees personal and legal security, the provision of basic services such as education, health, electricity, and political continuity and sustainability. There are conditions that attract and encourage return. But again, the issue of participation does not depend on return, and the strategy consists of how to make the most of and benefit from having a diaspora.
Other factors also influence the decision to return, such as the need for human capital in specific areas and the internationalization of companies and institutions. It may also be promoted by companies and institutions in the host country that are interested in investing or establishing partnerships with companies and institutions in Venezuela.
When asked how to attract the diaspora, our response is to strengthen the channels of participation that it has created and the organizations that have made this possible. To this end, it uses the arsenal of technologies, applications, and programs offered by the Internet so that they can participate from their place of residence. In our studies, 80% of those surveyed and interviewed told us that they do not wish to return to the country, and more than 90% expressed their willingness and interest in being part of the process of restoring democracy to begin rebuilding the country. That is why our focus is on the latter, their demonstrated commitment to Venezuela.
That does not mean a return because there has never been an absence. And even more so at this time of globalization of communications, ease of travel, being able to take a plane and move around. Let’s say that all the facilities that exist today would make it much easier for the diaspora to participate in the process of recovery and reconstruction in Venezuela.
6. How should a new government handle it?
The new government should understand, first and foremost, that there is a reality: Venezuela’s social, economic, institutional, and cultural geography has undergone a major transformation, a change both in the country’s crust and in its core. This mutation requires a paradigm shift in understanding the country and in formulating development strategies. The country cannot be thought of in isolation from its diaspora and its performance. Some people talk about the return in such a banal way that it is surprising. Let us imagine for a moment the mass return of more than 9 million citizens and what that would mean in terms of demand for services, housing, employment, etc. Furthermore, after 27 years of authoritarianism and dictatorship, many have managed to establish themselves socially and economically in their host communities.
Even if there is a significant return, it will not necessarily happen in the short term. The questions should be different: How can a new government take advantage of the capabilities of the diaspora? And what must a new government do to take advantage of this international reserve, this human capital that is now scattered around the world, which has acquired new languages and cultures, broader relational capital at both ends (origin and host), all of which is of enormous interest to investors, companies, and institutions.
The central issue, we reiterate, lies in how to leverage human capital, how to strengthen the transnational organizations and networks created by the diaspora, which are repositories of key intangibles for development: trust, reputation, and credibility.
7. What do you suggest to make returning to their homeland attractive to the skilled workers who left?
Please excuse our insistence, but participation has nothing to do with and does not depend on the return. That said, human capital with academic training and skilled labor can be used and leveraged in a thousand ways. In investment, internationalization, training, mentoring, technical assistance, and consulting processes, among others. Participation does not require physical presence; it can take place virtually and without the need to move from where you live.
There are other mechanisms at our disposal. The diaspora portal, which has been in our project portfolio since 2015, is a means of facilitating the recruitment of personnel specialized in certain technical areas. The answer to the question allows for multiple possibilities and variations, and one of the keys lies in what has already been pointed out: improving the diaspora information system. Today we know how many there are, where they are, and the profile of their organizations and networks. In some sectors and specialties, we have been able to make significant progress. This effort needs to be deepened and is a key aspect of the governance strategy outlined in our latest book.
We insist that the diaspora and its organizations are already participating in the country’s recovery. An example of this is the quantum physics network that brings together Venezuelan researchers. Venezuelan universities and researchers currently residing in France, Colombia, etc. participate in this network. The entrepreneurship network, the freedom of expression and communication network, the mental health network, and the network designing the new foreign service appropriate to the country’s new geography have all made progress despite and in opposition to the regime, which not only ignores the existence of the exodus but also erects obstacles to prevent their participation. The impediments range from identity documents and passports to the persecution of civil society organizations and the discrediting of those who support the diaspora. The suffocation has been unlimited and blatant. A change in conditions will facilitate participation, which will multiply with relative ease when conditions allow.
But, I repeat, the diaspora is already doing this. It is doing so in the field of the environment, in academia, in engineering, in medicine, in all fields it is doing its work, and what would make a difference is the possibility of strengthening this and accelerating and multiplying it.
8. Given the number of Venezuelans living abroad, and as a way of maintaining closer ties with the country, do you think it would be desirable for them to have representation in the national parliament, as is the case in other countries?
Venezuela is party to international agreements that enshrine the right of all citizens to vote and be elected regardless of their place of residence. The Venezuelan Constitution allows the diaspora to participate in two types of elections: presidential elections and referendums. It does not, however, allow members of the diaspora to be elected. The Venezuelan regime, which boasted of having the best Constitution on the planet, constantly violates it, particularly in this area, as well as other laws and regulations related to elections.
Let’s see. The first obstacle is the violation of the right to identity, which is more acute in the case of the diaspora, an issue denounced in the reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. This disregard has led to a proliferation of stateless children. If my memory serves me correctly, in Colombia alone, more than 130,000 children in this situation have been granted nationality. Former Colombian President Iván Duque granted nationality to more than 40,000 Venezuelan children. Access to other documents such as passports is conditional on having an identity document.
Members of the diaspora are treated as second-class citizens by the Venezuelan regime. They face higher costs to obtain a passport and requirements, which are not even requested by host countries, to exercise their right to register to vote. To participate in the electoral process, all Venezuelans must be registered in the permanent electoral registry. More than 4 million citizens have been unable to update their information in that registry, and more than 6.5 million have been excluded and therefore cannot vote. For citizens in the diaspora, it is not enough to be registered and have an identity document; the electoral body established ad hoc rules that, fortunately, are not even required by host countries. In addition to an identity document, they are required to be registered with the consulate and provide proof of legal residence in the host country.
Thinking about the new reality and the changes that will need to be made, we have held meetings with representatives from Italy, France, and other countries, and interviewed Venezuelan deputies with dual nationality who have been elected to the Italian parliament as representatives of the Italian diaspora in Latin America. We believe that a change in the Venezuelan Constitution is necessary in order to allow for the fulfillment of this right, which is another element of the strategy of governance and representation of the diaspora in the decisions of a country with a new geography.
There is much we can and must learn from these experiences and from the institutions they have established to engage with and benefit from their diasporas. Beyond parliamentary representation, they have set up regional councils where the diaspora can express its voice and maintain a sense of Venezuelan identity that is now present across the globe.
9. As Coordinator of the SME and Entrepreneurship Observatory, you have a clear vision of Venezuelan entrepreneurial capacity. How can the entrepreneurial capital of the diaspora and the international experience acquired be leveraged to drive internal economic reconstruction, especially in strengthening Venezuelan SMEs?
Yes, business and entrepreneurship have been areas of great interest to the Observatory, as well as to me personally. I directed the first observatory for small and medium-sized enterprises. We created a map of companies in the country’s 335 municipalities and 24 states. The map contained the number of SMEs grouped by sector: industry, commerce, services, tourism, and agriculture.
We published the first observatory thanks to the support of the Andean Development Corporation and presented it at their facilities in 2000, if my memory serves me correctly. We published the second one in 2004-2005, using information from local and regional governments and more than 7,000 files from educational institutions. We published the third and final SME observatory in 2013, a year in which a legal fence had been built around private activity and the market.
The second and third reports confirmed how the model implemented in Venezuela led to the gradual closure of companies, which were replaced by crony companies, importers who benefited from the government’s preferential dollars. They took advantage of the highest income ever received by any government in the history of Venezuela for their own benefit, while destroying and reducing to rubble the company that provided the resources: from more than 3 million barrels per day, it reduced its production to 500,000 barrels, and today, thanks to the companies it despised, it is approaching 1 million barrels, less than a third of what it produced when they came to power. Most of those who ran the company and the sector are in prison or wanted by the law.
We have addressed the issue of entrepreneurship and in 1997 we established INFOEM (Institute for Business Training) at the Metropolitan University. Together with other organizations, we addressed the issue of entrepreneurship in the informal economy, a sector that in 2003 accounted for 53% of employment in Venezuela.
The diaspora is also involved in entrepreneurship, so we have brought together organizations working on entrepreneurship in the old map and in the new geography. We have drawn up proposals that we have submitted to the Inter-American Development Bank, the ILO, and the Andean Development Corporation (CAF). A concept note has been drawn up with the IOM to promote regional entrepreneurship. Our most recent study on entrepreneurship and the diaspora in Latin America and the Caribbean indicates the need to do away with existing schemes and criteria in order to design new social policy modalities in the field of promoting innovation and business creation.
We say in the study that it is most similar to a process of nuclear fission, that is, the fragmentation of international efforts of all kinds, training, startups, technical assistance, mentoring, and local financing. It is a map that tells us about the need for a profound change in social policy aimed at promoting issues such as entrepreneurship, which has to do not only with capacities, institutions, policies, and financing, but also with many actors, and which requires the participation of all of them in order to have an adequate impact and produce the desired effects. I believe that this is an issue that the diaspora has been working on, with organizations developing projects that have been presented to international bodies on the subject of entrepreneurship.
Three years ago, we launched an initiative at the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, a concept note involving the International Organization for Migration, Venezuela’s leading business organizations, the Colombian-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce, the Colombian Ministry of Finance, and the Colombian Ministry of Trade.
There are initiatives being promoted that would require greater effort and better understanding on the part of multilateral organizations and private sector umbrella organizations because, at the end of the day, the process of integration, the process of managing diasporas, and not just the Venezuelan diaspora, but other diasporas that exist in Latin America, such as the Haitian diaspora, which has a huge presence in Chile, for example. The Colombian, Peruvian, Bolivian, Paraguayan, and Brazilian diasporas, let’s say all these diasporas, currently have an enormous opportunity to take advantage of their entrepreneurial capacity and promote integration processes.
The International Labour Organization is taking its first steps in this direction, which I believe should be applauded and recognized. However, this is an effort that requires understanding.
The very fragmentation of efforts on the ground highlights the need for a shift in this area of policy aimed at promoting and strengthening entrepreneurship and business creation, which is the mechanism that enables rapid integration, access to employment, and the generation of social cohesion, insofar as migrants integrate into economic processes as employees and/or entrepreneurs.
The diaspora can play a role, first, by making investments—which in some cases it already does—but also in the area of internationalization.
Supporting the internationalization of SMEs is more challenging than for large companies. Large firms have dedicated units for tracking information and the financial capacity to hire specialized consulting firms, whereas for small and medium-sized enterprises, having a diaspora represents a highly valuable asset. It allows them to access information quickly and at low cost, navigate languages and cultures, and rely on partners who facilitate internationalization because they are familiar with local contexts and can guide business decisions.
If there is one key asset for small and medium-sized enterprises and their strengthening under the old economic map, it is having that diaspora. Under the new map, having a diaspora also means the possibility of internationalization in both directions for SMEs. Large companies can stand on their own, but small and medium-sized enterprises make up 95% of the global business fabric.
10. Looking ahead, and acknowledging the immense task of reconstruction, what do you believe should be the primary role of the diaspora in rebuilding Venezuela’s social fabric, restoring trust in institutions, and reinforcing shared values?
More than something that lies in the future, this is already what the diaspora has been weaving in the present. There is a complex and dense organizational fabric that has forged a governance strategy built through sustained effort—by doing, connecting, learning. Life itself has carried out a kind of selection process, validating those organizations that truly work—non-profit organizations (NGOs)—and disengaging from those that pursue profit without purpose.
This network has been built thanks to collaboration and cooperation among organizations and associations, based on TRUST and RESPECT. First by getting to know one another, then by exchanging ideas, and later by designing joint projects whose pace varies according to the strengths of each organization and network. I consider one of the major challenges to be the strengthening of Venezuelan organizations and associative networks within this New Geography.
This challenge is by no means minor, as recent experience has shown us. The unfortunate attempts to colonize organizations have made this clear. From that experience, we must extract lessons of enormous value for the design of a connected Official Diplomacy—one whose practice is supported by and respectful of the “Public Diplomacy” exercised by diaspora organizations. These are organizations with 27 years of experience, others with 15, 10, or five—organizations that know what they want to do, are respected by their compatriots, and that, at times, are forced to hibernate due to a lack of resources. They demand support; they need strengthening in order to manage their work more effectively. At times they will align with official policy; they are interlocutors and multipliers in areas such as culture, gastronomy, entrepreneurship, scientific and technological exchange, internationalization, and the defense of the human rights of the diaspora.
The great challenge is to restore lost trust, respect plurality, and develop the capacity to listen. TRUST is a core component of economic development. Its absence translates into disinvestment and conflict. The construction of trust is facilitated when shared values exist, as is the case within this network of organizations: plurality, participation, and democracy. This effort has been built from the ground up and has progressively shaped the diaspora’s governance strategy and a model of its own through which it engages with the world.
The views expressed by Tomás Páez are of his personal ownership and responsibility, and do not necessarily reflect the position of PDVSA Ad Hoc.
