In the first installment, we described the “credit-for-oil” pattern with which China consolidated its position in the Venezuelan sector. This second part focuses on the internal architecture of opacity that allowed these agreements to become a breeding ground for large-scale corruption—and on recent cases that illustrate the economic and governance costs: from the seizure of three Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) linked to the joint venture with PetroChina in Singapore, to a portfolio of US$19.6 billion in failed non-oil projects and a ghost fleet of at least 24 ships in 2025 to evade oversight. We conclude with a list of guarantees to attract transparent investment without mortgaging future oil reserves.
Recap: The Belt and Road Pattern
Between 2007 and 2016, Chinese loans to Venezuela exceeded US$62.146 billion under the “oil-for-loans” modality, replicating the logic of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): equity + credit + hydrocarbon infrastructure. Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) and the joint venture PetroSinovensa (PDVSA-China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)) synthesize this formula in the Orinoco Belt: ensuring supply with equity participation and operational control.
The architecture of opacity that made it possible
The interview with Mercedes De Freitas details institutional regression: exchange and price controls—Foreign Currency Administration Commission (Cadivi)/National Foreign Trade Center (Cencoex); National Superintendency for the Defense of Socioeconomic Rights (Sundde)—turned into incentives for corruption; capture of powers; weakening of fiscal control and public procurement; and “communicational hegemony” to formalize opacity.
This scaffolding was completed with exclusions from tenders, extra-budgetary funds, and regulations that enable secret decisions: the Constitutional Anti-Blockade Law for National Development and the Guarantee of Human Rights (Anti-Blockade Law), PDVSA’s internal regulations of 2018, and confidential public-private partnerships (PPPs). The result: hundreds of agreements without accountability and fertile ground for circumventing controls.
Test cases: hard signals of cost and risk
- Strategic assets in dispute (Singapore): The joint venture CV Shipping Pte Ltd (PDVSA-PetroChina) was liquidated by court order; PetroChina took control of the VLCC Junín, Boyacá, and Carabobo to cover debts. The signal is clear: collateral tied to debt allows partners to take critical logistics assets.
- Failed portfolio outside the oil sector (fiscal and social impact): US$19.6 billion in projects in electricity, transportation, manufacturing, and agriculture were left unfinished or with minimal progress—without investigation by the Comptroller’s Office or the Attorney General’s Office—while payments conditioned essential spending and forced PDVSA to hand over production or shares (for example, in PetroSinovensa).
- Evasion and sanctions (ghost fleet): In 2025, Transparencia documented at least 24 vessels operating without Automatic Identification System (AIS) identifiers, facilitating the diversion of crude oil and evasion of international oversight, with stopovers/destinations in Asia: a compliance risk that increases insurance premiums, closes markets, and blocks clean refinancing.
What we learned (and what to change): three layers of guarantees
Layer A — Default transparency (open data and traceability)
- Proactive publication of contracts and annexes (without confidentiality clauses).
- Single Registry of Investments in open data, including final beneficiaries.
- Risk matrix (sanctions, routes and shipments, Protection & Indemnity (P&I) policies) and quarterly compliance reports.
Layer B — Standards and corporate governance in state-owned/mixed companies
- Adherence to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) commitments.
- Boards with functional independence and limits on turnkey contracts.
- External audits with publication of findings.
Layer C — Minimum legal sheet for credibility
- Reform of the Organic Law on Public Sector Financial Management (LOAFSP) and the Procurement Law.
- Repeal of the Anti-Blocking Law.
- Strengthening of the Transparency and Access to Information Law.
- Effective classification of nepotism, revolving door, and gifts to officials.
- Approval of lobbying law.
- Reinstatement of extra-budgetary funds to the National Public Credit Office (ONCP) and the Treasury.
Immediate sectoral focus (hydrocarbons)
Operational priorities
- Contractual inventory of joint ventures and concessions with China (financial statements, committed crude oil flows, guarantees, covenants) and publication of a standardized executive summary.
- Lifting & shipping policy with AIS traceability/port state inspections to eliminate opaque fleets.
- Remediation plan for logistics assets (tankers, terminals) to reduce vulnerability to seizures or liens.
Financial priorities
- Timeline for phasing out “oil-for-debt”: semi-annual targets for replacement by spot price/transparent formulas.
- Anti-corruption clauses and mandatory international arbitration in new contracts.
- Diversification of counterparties (competition by blocks) under public rules.
In closing: from “loans for oil” to “contract governance and open data”
The model that combined loans, equity, and confidential construction projects did not lead to operational or financial recovery; it did leave behind debt, litigation, and a loss of autonomy. The solution is not rhetorical: clear rules, real oversight, and verifiable transparency to attract patient capital, renegotiate on better terms, and avoid mortgaging future barrels again.
