In 2001, Venezuela produced more than 3 million barrels per day and ranked first in the world in exports according to OPEC. Twenty-five years later, production is less than 1 million barrels per day, and although the country has the largest proven reserves on the planet, it ended up importing gasoline and diluents to sustain its own energy system, thanks to the debacle engineered by 27 years of the Chavista regime.
In the fields of Zulia or the east of the country, idle drilling rigs and corroded flow stations are more than a visual metaphor: they are physical evidence of a model that promised absolute sovereignty and ended in operational collapse.
It is in this context that, in January 2026, the National Assembly approved, in just two sessions, a partial reform of the Organic Law on Hydrocarbons, marking an explicit break with the state oil monopoly that had defined official discourse for a quarter of a century.
Under the new reform scheme, although the State maintains a shareholding of 50% or more in joint ventures, it could transfer or delegate to minority private partners the right to technical and operational management of oil projects, meaning that PDVSA would no longer be the exclusive operator. This model of private participation may also be applied to projects developed entirely by PDVSA subsidiaries, as well as to new projects.
In practice, this means that a company with technical expertise and financial capacity can lead drilling, maintenance, and field optimization, even with a minority stake.
In a country where talent drain and disinvestment have eroded the state’s operational capacity, this new guideline seeks to solve a specific problem: putting the oil value chain in the hands of those who know how to produce—and also have the real capacity to do so.
The reform also allows the National Executive to authorize private partners to directly market their production quota on international markets, which—if implemented correctly—should help reduce the state monopoly on the industry and also generate greater economic dynamism.
The most immediate and likely effect is not macroeconomic, but regional. If new private operators reactivate dormant fields or improve production in existing areas, this could generate technical jobs, demand for local services, rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, and greater economic circulation in oil-producing regions such as Anzoátegui, Monagas, and Zulia.
This is not a national boom, but rather a targeted revitalization: workshops, transportation, industrial maintenance, and local commerce may experience greater dynamism. In depressed economies, this effect is significant.
However, partial recovery in production will depend on the arrival of operators with real investment capacity. And the new law has not yet passed that test, because it has not been tried and tested on existing models. Companies are watching and studying the terrain.
Rehabilitating mature fields, improving recovery, or developing new areas requires intensive capital and technology. If companies with technical muscle actively participate, a gradual recovery could be observed.
But producing more is not automatic. Deteriorating infrastructure, a shortage of skilled labor, and the need for multibillion-dollar investments are limiting the speed of the rebound.
Sustained growth depends on variables that the reform does not directly address: judicial independence, macroeconomic stability, predictable fiscal rules, and effective anti-corruption measures. A law can enable operations that were stalled and even contribute to reviving local economies to some extent, but it cannot, on its own, rebuild national institutions.
The future of the Venezuelan industry will depend not only on what the law allows, but also on the country’s ability to rebuild confidence, both internally and externally, in its institutions. This implies restoring democratic legitimacy as the foundation of national institutions, an indispensable condition for achieving verifiable results: more barrels produced, more formal employment in oil-producing regions, greater contractual transparency, and stability in the rules of the game, so that the large amounts of capital Venezuela needs to reactivate its oil industry can arrive.
From here, we warn that if attractive projects are not designed and minimum legal and economic guarantees are not provided, the most honest response is nuanced: reforming the Hydrocarbons Law may be a necessary condition, but it is not sufficient, which will result in another resounding failure of the regime in the oil sector.
